The Catalan Civil War
- Bruce Boyce
- Sep 27
- 8 min read

How a 15th-century revolution anticipated the great constitutional struggles of England and France—and why it failed.
This is a companion piece to our latest podcast episode on 15th-century Iberia. Listen here:
In December 1460, a significant event occurred in European politics. When Juan II of Aragon arrested his son Charles of Viana during a session of the Catalan parliament, the assembled representatives didn't simply protest or negotiate—they created a rival government that would challenge royal authority for the next decade. The Consell representant lo Principat de Catalunya, established within days of Charles's arrest, embodied constitutional principles that would later appear in the major democratic struggles of England and France.
The preeminence of the Diputació is such that it does not admit royal interference," declared the Catalan revolutionaries. "This [Diputació] is the soul of the Principality of Catalonia." These weren't just rebellious nobles seeking personal gain, but constitutional theorists presenting a sophisticated alternative to royal absolutism. Their ideas—that kings rule by contract rather than divine right, that representative assemblies can legitimately oppose royal tyranny, and that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people through their elected representatives—share striking similarities with the constitutional debates that would later change Europe.
Unfortunately, this extraordinary constitutional experiment didn't succeed. By 1472, Barcelona was in ruins, Catalonia's economy was severely damaged, and royal absolutism had taken complete control. The fall of the Catalan Revolution prompts us to wonder why some constitutional efforts succeed while others fail, and whether resisting an absolute monarchy effectively required particular historical circumstances that 15th-century Catalonia simply couldn't offer.
To appreciate the importance of the Catalan Revolution, it's helpful to first understand how uncommon representative government was in medieval Europe. During that time, most kingdoms relied heavily on personal bonds between monarchs and nobles, with royal authority often depending on the king's ability to balance competing aristocratic factions. Formal restrictions on royal power were few and typically lacked effectiveness.

Catalonia stood apart. Since the 13th century, the principality developed advanced theories of contractual monarchy, making royal authority dependent on the consent of representative assemblies. The Franciscan political thinker Francesc Eiximenis (c. 1340-1409) explained these ideas most clearly, arguing that kings ruled through contracts with their subjects rather than by divine right. "The Corts are greater than [the king]," Eiximenis wrote, "as they made him lord, they can unmake him."
This contractual theory (pactismo) was more than just philosophical thinking — it was a real political practice backed by active institutions. The Catalan Corts managed taxation, legislation, and military matters, while the Diputació del General acted as a steady executive body, overseeing the principality's interests even when parliament wasn't in session. By 1400, these institutions truly shared sovereignty with the Crown.
The system worked because it balanced royal authority with representative oversight while maintaining local autonomy and individual rights. Catalans enjoyed legal protections, economic freedoms, and political participation that were extraordinary for medieval Europe. However, this sophisticated constitutional structure would face its greatest challenge when confronted by the emerging absolute monarchy of the early modern period.
The constitutional crisis originated from a fundamental clash between Catalan political values and the absolutist ambitions of the Castilian Trastámara dynasty that had governed the Crown of Aragon since 1412. Juan II embodied everything Catalans opposed in royal rule: he believed kings ruled by divine right with unlimited power, famously declaring that "the aforesaid Majesty is not bound to give reasons for his acts, except to God."

This worldview was incompatible with the Catalan pactismo. When Juan arrested his son, Charles, during a session of the Catalan parliament in December 1460, he violated multiple constitutional protections and demonstrated his disrespect for representative government. The arrest turned a family dispute over the inheritance of the Kingdom of Navarre into a major constitutional crisis about the nature of political authority.
The Catalan response was quick and firm. Within days, the Corts transferred emergency powers to the Diputació in Barcelona, while a new revolutionary council took over the government. The assembled representatives effectively removed their king and claimed sovereign authority in the name of constitutional principles.
The revolution's legitimacy was based on advanced political ideas that connected closely to later democratic principles. Catalans believed that Juan had violated the fundamental contract between the monarch and the people, which made resistance not only acceptable but also necessary. They emphasized that ultimate sovereignty belonged to the people through their elected representatives, which made the Diputació more rightful than royal authority when conflicts arose.
The Catalan Revolution occurred during a crucial time in European political history, as traditional medieval rule was transitioning to early modern state systems. Throughout the continent, monarchies faced similar challenges from representative institutions that claimed to limit royal authority; however, the results varied significantly depending on the circumstances.
The Holy Roman Empire served as the most successful contemporary model of representative resistance to centralization. The Imperial Diet (Reichstag), representing the three estates of Electors, Princes, and Imperial Cities, had effectively federalized imperial authority since the Golden Bull of 1356. Throughout the 15th century, the Diet successfully resisted repeated imperial efforts at centralization while maintaining local parliamentary institutions across the German territories.

The Empire's federal system allowed local representative assemblies to keep their authority within a structure that upheld imperial dignity. This approach might have saved Catalonia if compromise had been possible, but the Catalans' dedication to contractual monarchy made them unwilling to accept formal subordination to royal authority.
The Hussite movement in Bohemia (1419-1436) merged religious reform with constitutional resistance to imperial authority. The Bohemian Diet used religious grievances to justify systematically limiting royal power, creating a form of constitutional monarchy that persisted into the 15th century. The Bohemian example demonstrated that representative institutions could effectively oppose centralization when supported by popular religious sentiment and unified leadership.
However, Bohemia's success relied on religious solidarity that Catalonia couldn't replicate, and the Bohemian Diet faced less determined opposition than the Catalans faced from Juan II's systematic campaign.
The most successful modern example of representative government was the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm, which during this time developed increasingly sophisticated limits on royal power. The Sejm controlled taxation, legislation, and foreign policy, establishing a constitutional monarchy that would last for centuries. Polish kings governed with the support of their parliament, accepting constitutional restrictions in exchange for the resources needed to defend the country’s vast frontiers.
The key difference was that Poland's external threats motivated cooperation between the crown and parliament, while Catalonia's conflict was mainly internal. The Sejm's success also benefited from the kingdom's large size and resources, advantages that Catalonia completely lacked.
Even in France, the Parlement of Paris held significant constitutional authority throughout the 15th century, asserting the right to review and reject royal legislation. While Louis XI gradually diminished the Parlement's political influence, he never entirely eliminated its constitutional role. The Parlement's endurance showed that representative institutions could survive even under strong royal pressure, as long as they had enough institutional strength and popular backing.

However, the Parlement's authority was mainly judicial rather than legislative, resulting in a narrower scope compared to the Catalan Corts' extensive powers over taxation, legislation, and military policy.
The Catalan Revolution's ultimate failure came from structural disadvantages that successful representative movements in the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, and Bohemia did not encounter. Understanding these factors sheds light on the broader conditions needed for successful resistance to absolute monarchy.
Diplomatic Isolation
Unlike the Bohemian Diet, which could attract broader religious unity across Central Europe, or the Polish Sejm, which faced external threats that prompted foreign alliances, the Catalans never gained dependable foreign support. Their appeals to Castile, Portugal, and Anjou all failed because these powers ultimately had their own strategic interests that conflicted with Catalan independence. France under Louis XI was especially deceitful, offering support while secretly negotiating with Juan II for territorial concessions.
The lack of foreign support was vital because 15th-century warfare favored professional armies over citizen militias. The Catalans could never match the military resources available to Juan II through his various kingdoms, while their enemies controlled the sea and could blockade Barcelona indefinitely.
Social and Economic Limitations
The Catalan Revolution was mainly led by urban oligarchies and noble factions, unlike the broader popular movements that supported Bohemian resistance or the unified noble-parliamentary cooperation seen in Poland. While the revolutionaries developed advanced constitutional theories, they did not manage to rally the large numbers of people seen in other successful movements of that era. The rural remensa peasants stayed divided, and artisans and workers in Barcelona were more focused on economic matters than constitutional principles.
This narrow social base made the revolution more vulnerable to the powerful economic warfare that Juan II skillfully employed. The ten-year conflict took a heavy toll on Catalan commerce and agriculture, slowly eroding the people's support for continuing the fight. As the territory shifted back and forth between royal and revolutionary forces, the revolutionaries found themselves increasingly confined to Barcelona and its surrounding areas.
Geographic Vulnerability
Catalonia's geographic location made it vulnerable to determined attacks from the interior. Unlike the Holy Roman Empire's fragmented geography that hindered centralization, or Poland's vast size and resources, Catalonia could be invaded from Aragon, blockaded at sea, and cut off from foreign support. The loss of Roussillon and Cerdagne to France eliminated potential escape routes and showed the revolution's failure to protect its territory.
By 1471, after Gerona fell to royal forces, the revolutionaries held little more than Barcelona itself. The final siege in 1472 reduced the constitutional experiment to a starving city, making surrender unavoidable regardless of constitutional principles.
The failure of the Catalan Revolution teaches us valuable lessons about what is needed for a successful stand against an authoritarian government. Although the Catalans developed advanced constitutional ideas and established innovative representative institutions, they lacked the strategic advantages that enabled ongoing movements in the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, and Bohemia to achieve their goals.

Successful constitutional movements typically require either territorial protection and division (similar to the Empire's decentralized system), sufficient size and resources to resist military force (as seen in Poland-Lithuania), or unifying ideological components that transcend local interests (such as Bohemian religious unity). Catalonia lacked all of these advantages, making long-term resistance extremely challenging regardless of whether their cause was just.
Constitutional revolutions also need widespread popular support to endure protracted conflicts with established authority. The Bohemian Hussites and Polish parliamentary nobility succeeded because they could rally broader social coalitions than their opponents, while the Catalan Revolution stayed limited to urban oligarchies and noble factions.
Finally, timing and external circumstances are crucial in constitutional struggles. Bohemia benefited from imperial weakness and religious division, while Poland's parliamentary system evolved in response to external threats that encouraged cooperation between the crown and parliament. The Catalan Revolution faced a determined king with significant resources and no external pressures that might have prompted compromise, making successful resistance significantly more difficult.
The Catalan Constitutional Crisis of 1462-1472 stands out as a significant effort to safeguard the spirit of representative government during a time when absolute monarchy was gaining strength. The revolutionaries crafted constitutional ideas that echoed principles found in later democratic theories, established representative institutions that prefigured modern parliamentary systems, and demonstrated that medieval political culture could evolve and develop into more advanced forms of constitutional governance.
Their failure wasn't because of flawed principles or poor leadership. Instead, it was due to structural disadvantages that other movements didn't face. However, their constitutional experiment still provided valuable ideas and set important examples for the development of European political thought. When democratic movements later succeeded in England and France, they borrowed similar arguments about popular sovereignty, contractual government, and justified resistance to tyranny. The Catalan Revolution illustrates that the shift to constitutional government wasn't necessarily inevitable or simple. Instead, it depended on specific historical circumstances that only rarely aligned in medieval and early modern Europe.
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